This article provides a succinct overview of trends in social policy provision in the Middle East and North Africa since the late 1950s. The main argument made in this piece is that the region underwent a period of social policy divergence up until the mid-1970s, followed by increasing convergence of social policy provision. This is demonstrated with reference to educational, health, and social security policies. The article also provides a brief outline of the historical legacies of social policies in the region, arguing that these were not the root of the divergence that occurred in the post-colonial period. Rather, the key driver of this divergence was dierences in the composition of the regimes' ruling coalitions: republican regimes adopted a strategy of populist mobilisation toward the working and middle class; monarchical regimes opted for a strategy of selective co-optation of (tribal) notables, business elites, and the armed forces. The article also highlights major challenges of social policies in the region, such as problems of inclusion, equity, and long-term eects on distributive expectations, and highlights their political economy underpinnings.
Introduction
Since the late 1950s, social policies and welfare distribution have been major areas of government activity across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), yet the region has been the stepchild of global social policy research. 1 With a few notable exceptions (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006; Gal and Jawad, 2013; Jawad and Yakut-Cakar, 2010; Cammett, 2011 Cammett, , 2014 Loewe, 2010) , social policies in the Middle East have neither received much attention of the ever-growing welfare state and development economics literature, nor have they attracted much scholarly attention from area specialist. This is all the more surprising given the extension and nancial weight of MENA social policies in regional comparison. In terms of the number of social security areas covered, such as old age, health, or unemployment, the MENA region ranks third behind Latin America and the Central Asia and Caucasus region, ahead of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa ( Figure   1 ). Regarding nancial commitment to social welfare, the region is on a par with other highspending regions in the developing world, dedicating about 8% of its GDP to social expenditures by the late 2000s ( Figure 2 ). Moreover, these average gures mask the remarkable performance of a number of MENA countries, such as Tunisia, Algeria, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which have consistently spent about half of their budget on social welfare and whose social security systems have covered at least two thirds of their population (Ben Romdhane, 2006; Ouzzir, 2006; Harris, 2010) .
That said, social policy regimes in the Middle East have also shown considerable variation in terms of their ability to reach vulnerable populations, their distributive eects, and their 1 This article follows the World Bank denition of MENA. I will use the term Middle East in a broad sense including North African countries. As a member state of the OECD, Israel is not considered in this article at it exhibits a dierent socio-economic structure to most other MENA states. 1 level of stratication and accessibility. These dierences in policy choices are reinforced by the tremendous variation in national wealth across the region, which is mainly an artefact of unequal endowments with natural resources. In fact, the region encompasses both the world's richest nations (e.g., Qatar, Kuwait) whose oil wealth have enabled them to build generous welfare states for the native populations, and some of the world's poorest nations (e.g., Yemen, Sudan) whose feeble nancial capacity has additionally been shattered by persistent violent conict. To deal with this issue, I will, where appropriate, distinguish between the six oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other non-GCC MENA countries. A further complication stems from the fact that social policies in a number of MENA countries have been poorly studied and data are thus limited. I am therefore compelled to focus on the better researched countries in the region. Finally, this article focuses on state-provided social policies and leaves the issue of non-state welfare provision to a separate, future article. This article is structured as follows: the next section briey describes the colonial legacies of social policies across the region. The following sections provide a succinct overview of social policies in the Middle East, highlighting a process of, rst, divergence and, then, convergence across the region. The third section will highlight a number of challenges in the eld of social policy, such as problems of inclusion, equity, and long-term eects on distributive expectations, and highlight their political economy underpinnings.
Colonial legacies
Although patterns of colonial encroachment during the 19 th and 20 th century varied across the region from complete incorporation as in Algeria to very lose protectorate systems in the Gulf it is safe to say that social policies did not constitute a matter of priority for colonial powers.
Concerned with maintaining domestic security and economic exploitation, colonial powers across the region left either no or only a very rudimentary social policy framework for the post-colonial regimes to build on.
In the countries of the French Maghreb, colonial social policies were uniquely geared to the minuscule elite of white-collar workers, frequently French nationals, and the nascent working class.
In Algeria, for instance, the French government introduced free medical assistance (assistance medicale gratuite) only for low-income segments of the French settler population, while the native population was left to charitable organisations (Kaddar, 1989) . In Tunisia, the only major social policy initiative was the introduction of a family allowance (allocations familiales) in 1918, a lump-sum social transfer given for each child (Chaabane, 2002) .
In Jordan, social policies in the form of free health care, housing, and education were mainly used as part of the British eort to pacify the East Bank tribes and build an eective tribal defence force tied to the newly established Hashemite ruler. It was thus instrumental, yet narrowly conned to a small segment of the population (Alon, 2007) . In Egypt, British authorities laid the 3 foundation for the main social assistance scheme until today subsidisation of basic commodities when they introduced food subsidies to urban areas in the aftermath of World War I (Omar, 2012; Ahmed et al., 2001) . Following the country's independence from the British in 1922, social policies, especially education, received increasing interest but really only became a policy priority following the Free Ocer coup under Nasser in 1952. In Syria and especially in Lebanon, colonial policies expanded access to health care and education rather unequally, privileging Christian and (other) minority populations at the expense of the Muslim majority (Thompson, 2013) .
Finally, in the Gulf monarchies British colonial rule had the main purpose of safeguarding trade with India, which means that development and social policies in particular were no immediate priority for the British. In addition, economic development was tremendously low in the Gulf sheikdoms before the onset of oil production, which for most countries only started after WWII (Owen and Pamuk, 1998) . This, in turn, meant that welfare distribution was mostly conned to charitable activity on the part of the ruler and few Christian missionaries (Niblock, 2015) . With the onset of oil production and the increasing threat from pan-Arab leftist ideologies on the rise in the 1950s, colonial authorities in collaboration with the ruling families started to pay greater attention to development policies, which lead to a rst noticeable expansion of health care and education facilities . This was then followed by more fundamental shift toward rent-based welfare states following the rst oil boom in 1973 (El-Katiri, Fattouh and Segal, 2011; Chaudhry, 1997 ).
Yet, even though colonialism did not entail marked dierences in terms of the extent of social provision, it still set countries on distinct paths in terms of types of social policies pursued by postcolonial regimes. In formerly French colonies (with the partial exception of Syria), post-colonial authorities took over predominantly Bismarckian social policy regimes which the French had established for their own civil servants, such as the provident society for Tunisian civil servants or the Moroccan public pension fund established in 1889 and 1930 respectively (Chaabane, 2002; Catusse, 2009 ). In Algeria, the French authorities extended the existing social security regime to the entire Algerian population themselves in a eleventh-hour attempt to win over the native population at the onset of the Algerian war of independence (Safar Zitoun, 2009 ). This path dependency in terms of policy design explains the predominance of insurance-based social security systems in the Maghreb, especially in the area of health care. This contrasts with mostly taxbased or mixed regimes prevalent in the countries of the Mashreq and, in a slightly dierent format, in the Gulf where most social policies are freely accessible to nationals only and nanced through oil rents.
Social policies since the 1950s: from divergence to convergence Broadly speaking, the development of social policies over the last six decades can be divided into two main periods: from the early 1950s until the mid-1970s, social policies in the region were characterised by a pattern of divergence whereby left-leaning republican regimes expanded social policies to a growing number of beneciaries, while conservative monarchical regimes remained on the back foot and restricted social policies to key constituencies of the regime (e.g., bureaucracy, military), yielding more segmented, corporatist welfare regimes. The key driver of this divergence was dierences in the composition of the regimes' ruling coalitions: republican regimes adopted a strategy of populist mobilisation toward the working and middle class; monarchical regimes opted for a strategy of selective co-optation of (tribal) notables, business elites, and the armed forces (Hinnebusch, 2010) .
However, this pattern needs to be qualied in two important respects. First, as far as the Gulf monarchies are concerned, the combination of, in most countries, small national populations and ample oil revenues allowed for the rapid extension of social policies to nearly the entire population.
Saudi Arabia by far the most populous Arab state in the Gulf came to emulate the generosity of its smaller neighbours after the rst oil boom in 1973 by rapidly increasing the public sector and rolling out welfare provision. Second, expansion of social policy programmes was not only inuenced by the incentives stemming from the regimes' respective ruling coalitions. Social policy commitments were also shaped, and in many cases hampered by, external threats emanating from a regional environment where large-scale external conicts were paramount. Resource-scarce states that were conicting parties in the Arab-Israeli conict (Egypt, Syria, Jordan) faced a particularly acute`butter or guns' trade-o between investing in national security or enlarging the state's welfare regime. This meant that, despite their populist impetus, social policies in Egypt and Syria were often impaired by insucient nancial and bureaucratic commitment (Eibl, 2016) .
Since the mid-1970s, social policies in the region have witnessed a trend of gradual convergence. This has been driven by the conuence of a number of events: rst, all populist republic regimes were forced to halt the expansion of their welfare regimes as their economic model based on state capitalism and import substitution ran into acute balance of payment problems, which in many cases necessitated painful IMF-led adjustment, followed by increasingly neo-liberal policies.
Second, bolstered by large oil rents Gulf monarchies rapidly caught up with and gradually surpassed their republican counterparts in terms of welfare generosity. Third, even resource-poor monarchies started to pay more attention to social policies. In the case of Jordan, this coincided with a gradual adjustment of public expenditures away from defence toward (social) development; Note: Aggregate social spending includes outlays for education, health, housing, social security and assistance. High-spenders denote regimes with aggregate welfare outlays consistently near the 50-percent mark (Tunisia, Algeria, Islamic Republic of Iran). GCC countries are not included in the graph due to a lack of consistent time-series data. Other countries included in the graph 6 This pattern of divergence and convergence is particularly visible when looking at the spending gures plotted in Figure 3 . 2 As far as spending is concerned, divergence reached a peak around the mid-1970s, after which spending patterns started to converge. This process was particularly pronounced in the elds of education ( Figure 3b ) and health (Figure 3c ), although the lower budgetary expenditures for health in high-spending countries was primarily driven by an expansion of health insurance coverage and thus a shift toward a more fully insurance-based system. In the following two sub-sections, I will describe social policies during these two periods in greater detail, with a particular focus on education, health, and social security and assistance. of all pupils received government scholarships to guarantee a more equitable access (Bennoune, 1988) . Lebanon had equally achieved full primary and 42 percent secondary enrolment in the mid-1970s
Divergence
In Egypt and Syria two front-line states in the Arab-Israeli conict the picture was more mixed: while the amount of primary schools double in Egypt between 1952 and 1976 (Waterbury, 1983 ) and the number of primary students doubled between 1964 and 1977 in Syria (Drysdale, 1981) , educational expansion was impaired by nancial bottlenecks and an increasing focus on higher education at the expense of primary education. In Morocco, Jordan, and Pahlavi Iran educational policies were also biased in favour of secondary and higher education, preventing a rapid expansion of access (e.g., Eilers, 1978 
Health
In the area of health care, states not only diered in the level of their nancial commitment but also in the institutional design of their health care system. Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Lebanon established a parallel structure in their health care system whereby a tax-based public health care sector has coexisted with an insurance-based system which allows patients access to both public and private facilities. This was often the result of post-colonial regimes taking over existing insurance-based systems for public sector employees from the colonial period while trying to widen health care access to the vast number of citizens without existing health insurance. In Tunisia, the government created two health insurance funds for private and public sector employees in 1960, while granting uninsured patients access to a practically free-of-charge publicly funded health care system (Camau, Zaïem and Bahri, 1990) . As insurance coverage increased, Tunisia went through a process of`de-budgetisation' whereby the government gradually apportioned the costs of health care to the public health insurance scheme. This process was similar in Algeria where the free-of-charge system gradually came to be used by the lowestincome segments only (CERMOC, 1992) . Egypt created a system in which free-of-charge health care is available to all citizens though mostly avoided due to chronic underfunding while a parallel networks of clinics and hospitals exclusively caters to those insured in the public insurance scheme (Clark, 2004) . Lebanon takes a special position in that the expansion of public health care was very limited and private health care provision has thus dominated (Cammett, 2014) .
Other regimes opted for predominantly tax-based health care systems. Syria, for instance, gradually established a universal health care system by enlarging the number of health card holders, which allowed access to free health care following a means test. The regime nally abandoned means-testing and introduced a national health service free of charge and accessible to all Syrian citizens. However, the gradual and lengthy introduction of universal health care meant that, for a long time, between a third and a fourth of the country's population were neither covered by the means-tested system nor any other social insurance (Drysdale, 1981) .
Access to health care was also problematic in Morocco where user fees in the public health care were so high that they eectively barred many Moroccans from access (Loewe, 2010) . Pahlavi
Iran provided free health care only for public sector employees who were covered by a public social insurance scheme. An equivalent private-sector scheme was only created in 1975, and the vast majority of the country's rural population (90%) still lacked access to medical facilities by the mid-1970s (Halliday, 1979) . Jordan created a highly stratied system where public sectors employees and members of the armed forces were covered by their own health insurance scheme, while all others had to paid a subsidised fee to access health care (Knowles, 2005 Social security and assistance
Divergence was also characteristic of other forms of social security beyond health insurance.
Populist republican regimes, on the one hand, tended to establish social security systems with a wider outreach and better coverage for private sector workers than their monarchical counterparts.
In Tunisia, a comprehensive social security regime including health, work accidents and workrelated illnesses, as well as maternity cover was introduced between 1957 and 1960. For public sector workers, the system also included a pension scheme, which was added for private sector private and public sectors workers were set up, yet they gravely suered from low levels of coverage and a clear bias toward the public sector (Melki, 2000) . Finally, in the Gulf monarchies nationals working in the public sector the vast majority have not only beneted from decent salaries and high levels of job security, but also from a wide-ranging social security regime that the Gulf states set up for their civil servants. That said, private sector schemes have been nearly equally generous.
In terms of social assistance, the predominant type of transfer used throughout the region, regardless of the regime's ideological background, has been the subsidisation of basic commodities and energy. While the origins of this system dier from country to country such as food rationing during the World Wars in Egypt or a bargain with labour to control wage ination in Tunisia the uniform application of the subsidy system meant that bread, as well as other staples like rice, milk, vegetable oil, and at times meat have been subject to strict price controls and thereby made available at prices signicantly below the world market price. This equally applied to energy products, such as petrol, diesel, and household gas, which have been oered either for free, as in the Gulf monarchies, or at strongly subsidised rates. By contrast, other forms of social transfers were poorly developed and thus only existed in a rudimentary way, such as the National Solidarity Fund in Tunisia or the Sadat pensions for the poor in Egypt.
Convergence Education
Since the mid-1970s, educational policies in the Middle East have been characterised by three important trends that have led to a gradual convergence between republican and monarchical regimes:
First, levels of nancial commitment to education converged as high-spending countries were forced to cut back on spending due to economic diculties while resource-poor monarchies hiked up education spending. In the case of Jordan, this increase was partly the result of a peace dividend as hostilities in the Arab-Israel conict abated and a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan made a signicant reduction of defence expenditures possible. While, in theory, this would have also applied to Egypt, the economic situation of the country since the late 1970s through to the 1990s was such that most freed-up resources went into debt service which, at its peak, consumed about a quarter of public spending (Wahid, 2009 ). This period of retrenchment left a noticeable toll on the country's education system, with teachers forced into moonlighting because of low salaries, and many schools running several shifts a day to cope with the number of students (Harik, 1997 Second, following a global trend in educational policies, almost all Middle Eastern countries paved the way toward a generalisation of secondary education by loosening selective barriers and increasing the years of compulsory education to an average of currently 9 years across the region. This means that in all MENA countries secondary enrolment rates in the late 2010s stood between 75 and 85 percent, with the exception of Yemen (46%), Iraq (55%), and Morocco (58%). Concomitantly, the rise in secondary education has put pressure on the tertiary education system to deal with the higher student numbers. On average, between a quarter and two-thirds of an age cohort continue studying in higher education in the late 2010s. To make matters more complicated, there is a serious problem of mismatching between the demands of the labour markets and graduate cohorts who are more strongly drawn toward social sciences and humanities which traditionally paved the way for a career in the public sector in many countries historically the main employer. By contrast, more applied and vocational degrees are often considered secondrate and frequently do not oer much clearer job market prospects either (World Bank, 2008) .
Third, in the midst of demographic pressures, tight nances, and a strong demand for educational expansion, private education has expanded in a number of MENA regimes.
3 While education in traditional high-spenders, such as Algeria or Tunisia, has remained almost exclusively public, countries in economic diculties or with a less engrained commitment to public education have witnessed increasing levels of private education. This is particularly true in the area of higher education where middle-class demand for quality education has led to a mushrooming of private universities, such as in Egypt or Jordan with a share of 17 and 25 percent of private institutions respectively (World Bank, 2008; Kohstall, 2012 
Health
In the area of health care, we can also observe a gradual convergence across the region which, as far a spending levels are concerned, has been driven by the same underlying economic factors.
However, it should be noted that in MENA countries with a well-established public health insurance system, such as Algeria and Tunisia, spending reductions partly reected a shift of nancial obligations from the state budget on to the insurance system, and were not necessarily symptomatic of lower spending levels overall (Kaddar, 1989) . Convergence was facilitated by deliberated eorts to broaden the coverage of existing social security regimes to segments of the informal and low-income sectors, such as construction workers and domestic employees (e.g., Boudahrain, 2003) . As a result, coverage rates of public health insurances have signicantly increased in all MENA countries, with top performers such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Algeria, and Tunisia covering between 80 and 90 percent of their workforce. The only exception to this trend is Lebanon where health care provision has remained predominantly private which is both due to its weak legacy of (welfare) state building and the civil war which had propelled non-state actors into the roles of important welfare providers. In 2005, only 5 out of 160 hospitals were government-run (Cammett and Issar, 2010, 391) .
Convergence was particularly rapid in in Iran where the post-revolutionary regime has made social policies a key priority and lifted the country from one of the lowest spenders on social welfare into the group of high-spenders within just one decade (Harris, 2013) . This spending boost was accompanied by a sustained eort to roll out social security to the entire population, culminating in the extension of the public health insurance scheme (Medical Care Insurance Organisation, MCIO) to the entire population in 1994 (Messkoub, 2006) . In addition, the Islamic Revolution has also lead to the establishment of para-statal charities and foundations (boniyads ) which provide a wide range of social services including medical assistance (Harris, 2010) .
The 2000s In Egypt, the Mubarak regime also attempted to overhaul their public health insurance in view of achieving universal coverage. By universalising health insurance, the regime was hoping to address a number of defciencies in the health care system: high out-of-pocket expenditures (72 per cent) which have been driven by uninsured Egyptians opting for private health care instead of using the free-of-charge facilities provided by the Ministry of Health, the quality of which is considered very low; and the fact that the current health care insurance exclusively insures the policyholder and not any dependants (World Bank, 2015) . The reform also aimed at cost reductions to reign in the scheme's high decit and a partial privatisation of health care at a later stage. The reform attempt failed, however, due to serious resistance of health care professionals and existing policyholders and, crucially, due to the government's unwillingness to shoulder the nancial cost of subsidising the premiums of up to 40 percent of the Egyptian population. Successive post-revolutionary government have vowed to revive the project, so far to no avail.
Social security and assistance
In the eld of social security and assistance, policies have been motivated by two major concerns:
rst, reforming existing social security systems to include a greater share of the population as described above; second, reigning in the subsidisation system which in most countries have become an excessive drain on scal resources since the mid-1970s. A key problem of the food, mostly bread, and energy subsidy system is that its costs depend almost entirely on the vagaries of the world market price most MENA countries are net food and/or energy importers which makes budgets vulnerable to signicant external shocks.
As regards energy subsidies, the depth of reform varied from occasional price increases, especially for high-octane petrol used by the upper middle class, as happened in Algeria, most GCC countries since the fall of the oil price in 2014, and post-revolutionary Egypt; to the establishment of automatic indexation systems which still subsidise consumer prices but move them along the world market price within a certain range, as introduced in post-revolutionary Tunisia; to the partial or full abolishment of energy subsidies as occurred in Morocco, Jordan, and Iran. The
Iranian reform was particularly commended internationally as the country replaced energy subsidies with a unconditional cash transfer, which greatly improved public acceptance for reform, although the implementation of the reform has faltered since 2012 (IMF, 2014) .
As for food subsidies, reforms have mainly consisted of a combination of three dierent layers:
(i) eliminating less essential commodities, such as certain meats, sh, etc. from the list of subsidised goods; (ii) improving targeting and avoiding leakage into the black market by handing out smart cards to beneciaries and tightening controls on producers; (iii) occasional price increases mainly to alleviate acute scal pressures during periods of international price hikes. While these measures have certainly made the system more manageable, a legacy of food riots from the 1970s and 1980s coupled with a well-organised lobby on the part producers of subsidised goods has so far prevented the creation of an alternative social assistance scheme which would guarantee food security and at the same allow for a much better targeting of low-income populations. Some (Hertog, 2016) . Labour market segmentation is reinforced by a comparatively weak labour turnover of about 10 percent of the work force per annum (World Bank, 2013).
In the eld of social policies, this insider-outsider divide underpins the underdevelopment or underfunding of universal social security and assistance schemes, whereas welfare benets for labour market insiders are comparatively generous. This is particularly conspicuous with regard to pension schemes, which oer manifold possibilities for early retirement and in some countries replacement rates which exceed the last income, that is, above 100 percent (Hertog, 2016) . This means that social security systems across the region not only suer from weak vertical redistribution between well-o and vulnerable groups in society, but also from a pronounced intergenerational redistribution from the working age population to pensioners.
Attempts to attenuate this insider-outsider divide have been made for instance, by oering voluntary membership in the social security schemes to informal workers, such as in Tunisia but fundamental reforms toward more universally accessible policies have often been deterred by insider groups, who in the MENA region have quite a lot to lose. Segmenting the labour market has also been in the interest of regimes which have made divide and rule strategies a mainstay of their power. In turn, outsiders struggle to nd meaningful political representation in the absence of democratic competition in most countries and labour unions failing to represent the informal sector.
Inecient targeting
Another challenge of social policies in the Middle East is targeting as many policies fail to reach vulnerable groups in society. On the one hand, this is a correlate of the segmented nature of existing social security systems which being designed for and used by labour market insiders primarily reach a middle class constituency. On the other hand, even universally accessible social benets are often primarily reaped by middle-and upper-income groups. This is particularly true for the most widely used social transfer energy and food subsidies.
As regards energy subsidies, numerous studies have highlighted the regressive distributive eect of all forms of energy subsidies, be it petrol, gas, or electricity, as richer households proportionally consume more energy than poorer ones and tend to be better connected to the national electricity grid. Using household survey data, a recent IMF study (IMF, 2014) indeed found that the bottom 40 percent of the population typically only receive between 15 and 30 percent of energy subsidies (Figure 4a) . The system thus clearly represent a distributive mechanism in favour of the well-o.
As for food subsidies, it has rightly been pointed out that the availability of aordable basic commodities has contributed to the region's good performance in terms of malnutrition. As Cammett et al. (2015) point out, merely 8.3 percent of the MENA population suer from malnutrition compared to 12.2 percent in East Asia, 21.1 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, and 33.1 percent in South Asia. That said, this outcome seems more like a side eect of a system which similar to energy subsidies has been designed to benet a predominantly middle class constituency. Typically between 40 to 50 percent of all food subsidies go to the top two income quintiles, while the bottom 40 percent receive less than their fair share of the food subsidy bill ( Figure 4b ). In addition to this regressive income eect, food subsidies are also problematic from a viewpoint of regional equity as they chiey benet urban agglomerations with higher food consumption, whereas particularly bread subsidies are often of no use to poor rural households who supply their own bread. The reasons for the persistence of this suboptimal system again lie in the political economy dynamic underpinning it: middle class beneciaries are generally better organised and politically more valuable in authoritarian systems where quelling urban unrest is crucial. In addition, it is often overlooked that the subsidy system is supported by a signicant group of actors involved in the supply side of subsidies. First, public sector employees working in subsidy-related sectors, such as the vast public milling sector in Egypt, have shown a high capacity to mobilise against any attempt to increase competition between public and private sector producers of our as they, probably rightly, fear that the over-staed public mills would not be able to compete with the private sector. On the other hand, traders and merchants of subsidised goods have beneted handsomely from the market distortions that the subsidisation system provides. For example, wheat traders compete with the public sector agency (GASC) for the purchase of locally produced wheat; yet, by law, GASC is required to eventually buy up all locally produced wheat, which means traders sell their stock back to GASC, which drives up the prices and hands a lucrative prot to this group of intermediaries. Finally, the subsidy system has also been increasingly exploited by a group of politically connected actors who, like in Egypt and Tunisia, preferentially establish their companies in sectors beneting from energy subsidies or receive exclusive licences to produce subsidised goods, such as sugar (Eibl, 2016) . In combination, this factors have greatly complicated meaningful change toward a more equitable and ecient social safety system.
Distributive expectations
A third social policy challenge that all governments of the region have to deal with is the remarkable distributive expectations toward the state which are rooted in the real and perceived legacy of populist distribution. As regimes since the 1950s have made the promise to provide welfare and often also employment a mainstay of their legitimacy, citizens in the region have come to measure their governments by these very standards. However, even though many governments have clearly been unable to deliver on their promise since the mid-1970s, these expectations have been remarkably persistent.
For example, in the most recent World Value Survey nearly 35 percent fully agreed with the statement that the government is responsible everybody is provided for (Figure 5a ). This puts the MENA region ahead of all other regions, including those with a signicant communist legacy in Central Asia and Europe. In a similar vein, in nearly all MENA states 50 percent or more of all graduates have a preference for government jobs, with university graduates on top in a number of countries (Figure 5b) . Given the inability of most countries to signicantly widen the pool of labour market insiders in the short-to medium-term, making social policies more eective in reaching beyond insider groups will be key for governments to address the distributive expectations of their populations.
(a) Preferences for government provision Source: WVS 2012.
(b) Preferences for a government job Source: Hertog 2016, 25. 
